Modelling Robustness of Critical Infrastructure Networks
Srinath Pinnaka, Rajgopal Yarlagadda, and Egemen K. Çetinkaya

Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, Missouri University of Science and Technology – http://web.mst.edu/~mstconets

I. MOTIVATION
• Modelling the Interdependent Networks
The structure of a network of networks is comprised of complex
infrastructures, emphasising the importance of interdependency.
An interdependency is a mutual relationship between two
networks, which means the functionality of one network is
influenced by another network. Critical infrastructures, such as
transportation systems, communications, and power grid are
some of the examples of networks that are mutually dependent
on the connectivity of each other. In such interdependent
networks, when nodes in one network fail, they may lead to the
failure of dependent nodes in both the same network as well as
other networks, leading to a cascade of failures. The 2003
Northeast US power blackout and the 2003 Italy power blackout
are canonical examples of cascading failures in which failure of
a critical infrastructure results in cascading effect of failures on
other critical infrastructures. Therefore, there is a need to
rigorously model and analyse interdependent graphs.
• Analysis of Independencies
An important property that one should consider in analysing and
designing interdependent systems, is their robustness to
cascading failures. Many tools have already been developed to
study cascading failures, thus providing insight into the
behaviour of individual infrastructure networks. A far more
neglected area is that of the interdependency among multiple
infrastructure networks, including potential cascading effects.
Attackers can exploit potential vulnerabilities, causing a cascade
of failures in interdependent networks.
One of the objectives of this work is to analyse the complex
network of networks, and develop mechanisms and algorithms
to cope with challenges and attacks. The interactions and
interdependencies can be modelled using directional links.
Therefore, the tools developed must be capable of dealing with
unidirectional and bidirectional links. A further constraint on
such networks is the weight of the links, which can be used to
represent the level of interdependency between the nodes.
• Improving Resilience

IV. RESULTS and ANALYSIS

III. FRAMEWORK and DATASET
• Graph Interdependency Evaluation Framework

We applied our framework on the critical infrastructure graph
described in the topological dataset. The effect of adaptive
attacks on the nodes and links based on the four centrality
metrics is shown in Figure 2. We observe that all the node
centrality attacks have an equal impact on the critical
infrastructure for the first eight node attacks. Moreover, an
attack on the sectors in the graph impacts the robustness more
than an attack on the links between the sectors.

We build our framework using the Python NetworkX library. We consider the flow robustness to evaluate the
resilience of interdependent networks. Flow robustness of a network is a measure to compute the connectivity of the
network and it is the ratio of number of flows to the total number of possible flows in a network. Each time a node
is removed from the network, the flow robustness is calculated and normalised with the total number of flows of the
network, which is n(n-1), where n is the number of nodes in a network.
In our framework, the calculation of robustness is adaptive, which means after every attack, the flow robustness of
the network is recalculated considering the centrality values at each iteration. Attacks on a network can either be on
a node or on an edge. We model interdependent networks as directed graphs. To compute the robustness of the
critical infrastructure, we attack the nodes based on the graph centrality metrics. After each attack, we calculate the
flow robustness, compare with the result of the previous attack, and analyse the remaining flows of the
interdependent networks. There are several metrics to characterise the structure of a network; however, the targeted
attacks on the critical infrastructure are based on the centrality metrics since centrality explains how important a
node is in a network. We use degree centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, and eigenvector
centrality to discover the critical nodes in a directed graph.
• Graph Centrality Metrics
 Degree centrality: Number of incident edges upon a node
 Closeness centrality: Measure of distance (i.e. shortest path) among nodes
 Betwenness centrality: Number of shortest paths through a node or a link
 Eigenvector centrality: Importance of a node based on its connections to high degree nodes
• Topological Dataset
We apply our framework on the US critical infrastructure network in which critical sectors are dependent on each
other. Interdependency means the sectors are mutually dependent on each other i.e., there is a bidirectional
relationship between two sectors, whereas dependency is a unidirectional relationship.
We construct the interdependency graph based on the designated critical sectors by the US Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). In this graph, we designate each sector as a node and the connectivity between the sectors as
directed links. If there is an interdependency (i.e. mutual dependency) between two sectors, then we designate this
as a bidirectional link. If a sector is dependent on another, but this dependency is not mutual then we designate this
relation via an unidirectional link. The US critical infrastructure network is shown in Figure 1 with 16 nodes (i.e.
sectors) and 113 (57 unidirectional links and 28×2 bidirectional) links including unidirectional and bidirectional links.
The red arrows indicate mutual interdependency of the sectors whereas the black arrows indicate dependency of
one sector on another sector, as shown in Figure 1. For example, there is a mutual dependency between the
“communications” and “energy” sectors. The “transportation systems” sector depends on “communications” sector,
but this dependency is unidirectional (i.e. communications does not rely on the transportation systems).

For interdependent networks to be resilient and survivable to
attacks, the design of such infrastructure must optimise
principles such as heterogeneity and diversity. The ultimate
goal of this research is to develop mechanisms and algorithms
such that these complex networks, in particular critical
infrastructures, can withstand perturbations and continue to
operate.

II. RESEARCH GOALS
• Understand the evolution of interdependent graphs through
realistic modelling of networks

Figure 2. Flow Robustness under Node and Link Attacks

We also rank the 16 critical infrastructure sectors based on the
centrality measures as they are being removed from the
interdependent network, as shown in Table I. The ranks of the
sectors differed quite significantly when we compare centrality
attack results. We believe that this phenomenon is explained by
their graph-metric definitions. From our analysis, we conclude
that the critical node of a network varies depending on the
centrality metric we choose.
Rank Degree centrality

Closeness centrality Betweenness centrality Eigenvector centrality

1

Energy

Food and agriculture

2

Energy

Energy

Water and wastewater Energy

Water and wastewater

Communications

3

Communications

Emergency services

Critical manufacturing

IT

4

IT

Healthcare

Commercial facilities

Water and wastewater

5

Transportation systems Commercial facilities

Food and agriculture

Critical manufacturing

6

Food and agriculture

Chemicals

Transportation systems

7

Critical manufacturing Defense industrial base Transportation systems

Chemicals

8

Chemicals

Chemicals

Healthcare

Dams

9

Emergency services

Financial services

Emergency services

Food and agriculture

10

Healthcare

Nuclear

IT

Healthcare

11

Commercial facilities

Transportation systems Communications

Emergency services

12

Dams

Government facilities

Financial services

13

Financial services

Water and wastewater Government facilities

Government facilities

14

Nuclear

Dams

Nuclear

Nuclear

15

Government facilities

Communications

Dams

Commercial facilities

16

Defense industrial base IT

Defense industrial base

Defense industrial base

Critical manufacturing

Financial services

Table I. Ranking of Critical Infrastructure Networks

• Understand the dependency and interdependency of the
sectors in the critical infrastructure graph
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Figure 1. US Critical Infrastructure Network
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